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This article argues that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to control Somali piracy for four 
reasons. First, Somali piracy is a land-based problem and naval control mechanisms are not 
changing the incentives for pirates. Second, improving Somalia’s anarchic political situation 
will not necessarily stop piracy. Our analysis demonstrates that piracy is a business which 
improves with a more stable operating environment. Third, piracy is organized criminal 
activity, and like other organized crime groups will be difficult to control, especially if it 
becomes embedded in state structures. Finally, we argue that few of the relevant players 
have any real incentives to alter their behaviour.  
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The continued growth and increasing violence of piracy off the coast of Somalia has 
threatened international shipping in one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors and raised 
the spectre of maritime-based Islamist terrorism (Stevenson 2010, 36). Controlling piracy is a 
top priority for international policymakers. The EU has its first joint naval mission patrolling 
the area,
1  and there are NATO
2 and US-led missions present.
3 We argue that despite these 
initiatives, Somali piracy will at best be difficult, and at worst impossible, to control.   
Somali piracy threatens commercial shipping and poses a potentially significant threat 
to international peace and security. Data from the International Maritime Bureau reveals that 
there were 22 pirate attacks in 2000, rising to 108 in 2008 and 216 in 2009, 218 in 2010 and 
117 incidents up to 13 May 2011.
4 The shipping corridor off the coast of Somalia is 
strategically and economically important.  7% of the world’s oil supply travels through the 
Gulf of Aden (Kraska 2009, 243). Several shipping companies are diverting vulnerable ships 
and lengthening their journeys around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the Gulf of Aden 
altogether (Otten 2008). The total cost of piracy off the Horn of Africa including public and 
private counter-piracy efforts is estimated to be in the region of US$7-12bn annually 
(Bowden 2010). Pirate attacks have grown increasingly sophisticated (Saltmarsh 2009), both 
in terms of targeted vessel and location of attack.  Pirates are now able to attack vessels more 
than 1100nm off the coast of Somalia (Saltmarsh 2009). This development has required a 
significant improvement in tactics and equipment.
5 Over the course of 2010-2011, piracy has 
become noticeably more violent (Hurlburt 2011). 
The usual explanation for the intransigence of pirates in face of international control 
efforts is a two-step argument: first, piracy is a land-based phenomenon that manifests itself 
at sea, and second, the land-based problem is Somalia’s lawlessness. The view that “anarchy 
on land means piracy at sea” (Kaplan 2009), and the attendant policy prescription that truly 
ending piracy requires rebuilding Somalia, dominates the academic and policy worlds. US 
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Navy Vice Admiral William E. Gortney has stated that “the problem of piracy is and 
continues to be a problem that begins ashore” (American Forces Press Service 2009). NATO 
General William Craddock points out that “You do not stop piracy on the seas. You stop 
piracy on the land” (Charter 2008). The Ethiopian foreign minister has argued that “The 
pirates are not fish who just sprang up out of the sea. They came out of Somalia. It is far-
fetched to try to clamp down on piracy without first having put the situation in mainland 
Somalia under control" (Charter 2008). 
Academic commentators agree.  Max Boot (2009) argues that the discussion of 
counter-piracy would be largely superfluous “if only Somalia had a responsible government 
capable of policing its own territory.” James Kraska and Brian Wilson (2008/9, 46) point out 
that “any long-term solution to the region’s piracy threat requires addressing lawlessness in 
Somalia.” Ken Menkhaus (2009, 22) argues that “the Somali piracy epidemic is 
unquestionably an on-shore crisis demanding an on-shore solution.” Peter Pham (2010, 326) 
claims that piracy is a “land-based crime which happens to manifest itself at sea” making it 
difficult to control at sea alone. 
We argue that Somali piracy presents a worrying combination of factors that might 
make it nearly impossible to control. Even if some sort of land-based solution could be 
imposed, it would be unlikely to work, because piracy is organized crime and can benefit 
from more effective government structures. 
 Somali piracy is difficult to control for four reasons. First, Somali piracy is indeed a 
land-based problem in that the expected pay-offs from piracy dwarf the returns from any 
legal activity in Somalia, and therefore naval solutions are unlikely to work. We statistically 
analyse the pattern of piracy from 2002 to 2010 and show that naval control mechanisms 
have not had a significant effect on the number of attacks mounted by pirates.  Instead, as the 
probability of disruption and arrest in the Gulf of Aden has risen, pirates have moved further 
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offshore, invested in better equipment and changed their tactics, rather than giving up piracy. 
But if naval efforts are unlikely to be successful, does this imply that Somali piracy must be 
solved on land, and if so, how?  
Second, we argue that current views on how Somali piracy could be solved on land 
are misguided. Somali piracy does not thrive under conditions of anarchy.  The statistical 
analysis demonstrates that pirates benefit from improvements in the business environment in 
Somalia, while gang warfare and territorial conflict reduce the incentives to hijack ships. This 
is because pirates need reliable supplies to feed their hostages and safe havens during the 
lengthy ransom negotiations. We therefore posit that stability is good for Somali piracy.   
‘Solving’ the problems of Somalia, even if it is possible, may not solve the pirate problem. 
Third, we argue that Somali piracy is a business with significant features of mafia-
style organized crime groups. These groups co-exist with legal structures, often in symbiosis; 
there is no reason to expect that a stronger Somali state would stamp out the pirate problem. 
We present evidence that piracy took off in earnest when the Puntland government became 
unable to pay its security forces in April 2008, allowing pirates to capture governance in this 
region. The idea that Somali piracy is a criminal business that prefers stability to conflict 
poses a serious obstacle to resolution.  
Fourth, we argue that many of the relevant players (Somali pirates, local 
communities, nascent government in pirate regions, international navies, private security and 
the insurance industry) have no incentive to stop piracy. In fact, there is a relatively stable 
relationship between these groups, many of whom share a clear business interest in 
maintaining piracy at its current level.   
We make the argument that Somali piracy may be impossible to control in five 
sections. First, we provide a brief history of Somali piracy. Second, we provide statistical 
evidence that naval interdiction efforts have not changed incentives for Somali pirates. Third, 
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we show that Somali piracy does not thrive in conflict but improves in periods of economic 
stability. In the fourth section we argue that the reason for Somali piracy’s success is that it is 
a criminal business, with mafia characteristics, and that these characteristics suggest that 
building up state capacity may not solve the pirate problem, because the administration has 
been captured by pirates. The relationship between Somali pirates, local government, and 
even international government and non-government players may have evolved in to a stable 
relationship where the costs of altering the relationship are greater than the benefits of doing 
so.  Fifth, we examine the skewed incentives of all the players involved in Somali piracy.  
1. Origins and evolution of Somali piracy 
Somali piracy has its roots in a cocktail of factors: the background of civil war in the 
state, the failure of domestic and international efforts to create central governance in Somalia; 
poverty and displacement; and geographic opportunity. The tale of Somalia’s gradual decline 
from corrupt dictatorship to civil war and state failure, culminating in the UN intervention of 
the early 1990s, is well-known (Menkhaus 2007, 357-390). Somalia has been, if not in all-out 
civil war, in periods of substantial unrest for nearly twenty years, leading to a ready supply of 
small arms and those experienced in their use.   
Somalia has not been able to establish a central government.  Since 1991, 14 
governments “formed in exile have tried and failed to govern Somalia” (Stevenson 2010, 28). 
The latest, the Transnational Federal Government, met for first time in February 2006. From 
March to May 2006 fighting erupted between militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts 
(UIC) and the TFG.  In June 2006, the militias of the UIC took control of Mogadishu and 
parts of Southern Somalia. In December 2006 they were driven out of Mogadishu by 
Ethiopian troops and troops of the transitional government. However, conflict between 
Islamist insurgents fighting under the Al Shabaab banner and government troops continued 
through 2010, with Southern Somalia and Mogadishu seeing the greatest disruption. Somalia 
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“still epitomizes the failed state. The TFG has not collected taxes or provided effective social 
services, established a sound civilian law-enforcement organization enjoying anything like a 
monopoly on the use of force, or been able to make collective decisions for the populace” 
(Stevenson 2010, 32). Moreover, it has never been able to extend its authority much beyond 
Mogadishu.  However, in Puntland and Somaliland, local polities have emerged in which 
Islamic courts backed by clan elders, business people and Muslim clergy have established 
some form of rule of law (Menkhaus 2006-2007).  In Somaliland these structures have 
resulted in stable governmental structures with orderly transfers of power after elections 
(Walls 2009, 371-389; Hansen and Bradbury 2007, 461-476). Conflict and disorder is mainly 
restricted to Southern and Central Somalia.
6 
There is no question that Somalia’s dire economic situation and geographic location 
make piracy desirable.  2.87 million Somalis received food aid in 2009, and in 2008 GDP per 
capita was estimated at $298 (United Nations World Food Program - Somalia/Operations; 
UN Data - Somalia). A single pirate hijack can result in a ransom ranging from 
USD$500,000 to USD $3 million, with individual pirates’ profits estimated at about USD 
$10-15,000 (Gilpin 2009; Osma 2008).  The Gulf of Aden is a busy shipping route offering a 
tempting series of targets.  Somalia then represents a perfect collision of means (extensive 
small arms), motive (poverty) and opportunity (lack of governmental authority and proximity 
to shipping) for effective pirate operations. 
Somali piracy began in the early 1990s when local fishermen tried to expel foreign 
fishing trawlers (McKenzie 2008).
7  Local resistance evolved into an extortion racket that 
saw local militias extracting money from foreign fishing vessels for ‘licenses’; those who did 
not pay faced the threat of capture and kidnapping. (Menkhaus 2009, 22; Kraska and Wilson 
2009b, 225).  Gradually – as trawlers began to arm themselves - maritime extortion became 
more organized and transformed into piracy targeted at merchant shipping, which was well-
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established by 2005 (Kraska and Wilson 2009a, 75).  It is estimated that as many as 5000 
Somali men are working as pirates, divided into five large groups (Kraska and Wilson 2009b, 
225). 
Somali piracy is a low-technology business.  Pirates, armed with AK-47s and rocket 
propelled grenade launchers, “use small speedboats to capture a dhow or fishing vessel, and 
then use that as a mothership to ply waters far from shore in search of unguarded, lightly 
manned, slow-moving cargo ships” (Menkhaus 2009,22). The use of motherships extends the 
radius of operations well beyond Somalia’s coastal waters. Looking like legitimate fishing or 
trading vessels, pirate ships move unnoticed in the shipping lanes
8 and are no longer confined 
to harbor during the monsoon season. Motherships are either ransomed or abandoned when 
the stores run out or the vessel’s use as a mothership is suspected by naval forces (EU 
NAVFOR Public Affairs Office 2009). 
Hijacked ships are anchored in territorial waters near pirate strongholds in the 
Puntland villages of Eyl, Hobyo and Gharardeere until ransom negotiations are concluded 
(Harper 2008). There are no harbors which could accommodate a modern tanker or bulk 
carrier nor a land-side infrastructure which would allow pirates to move cargo off the ships 
and sell it in regional markets (Hastings 2009, 213-223). Nor can Somali pirates credibly 
threaten to give a ship a new identity and sell it off. Somali piracy is therefore a hijack and 
ransom business. The lack of infrastructure explains the surprisingly low ransoms relative to 
the value of the cargo.
9 Around USD $20-$40 million was paid in ransom in 2008, 
(Menkhaus 2009, 23) while the figure for 2009 was £70mn.
10 It also explains why Somali 
piracy is unlike the form of piracy common in the Straits of Malacca through the 1990s, 
where pirates typically killed the crew and used existing infrastructure to sell the ships and 
their cargos (Raymond 2009, 31-42).
11 However, it does appear that in 2010-2011 piracy has 
become more violent, a point which we will discuss further below. 
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2. Effectiveness of naval intervention 
There are now three multinational naval operations working to control piracy off the 
coast of Somalia. The European Union launched its first ever joint naval operation, Operation 
Atalanta, in November 2008, with the aim of protecting shipping in the region and ensuring 
that the vessels of the World Food Program (WFP) are able to deliver aid to Somalia.   
NATO’s Operation Allied Protector began in October 2008 and was replaced with Operation 
Allied Provider in March 2009.  NATO’s operations similarly began to protect WFP aid and 
have now been extended to include general counter-piracy. Under the auspices of the 
Combined Maritime Forces, based with the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, Combined Task Force 
151 (CTF-151), a multinational counter-piracy force, was set up in January 2009 to “deter, 
disrupt, and criminally prosecute those involved in piracy” (Kraska and Wilson 2009c, 244). 
CTF-151 is multinational, including Turkey, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
France. In addition, a number of navies patrol the area protecting their own shipping, such as 
Russia, India and China.  These multinational naval initiatives are backed up with the 
authority of a series of UN Security Council resolutions.
12 
These naval efforts represent unprecedented multinational naval cooperation (Kraska 
and Wilson 2008/9); the fact that the EU has authorized its first ever joint naval operation, 
out of area, signals the importance of counter-piracy for international navies. How successful 
are these unparalleled efforts? Is the claim that piracy is a land-based problem requiring a 
land-based solution borne out by the success of naval counter-piracy projects? Assessing the 
impact of counter-piracy operations is important not only because of the strategic and 
commercial impact of piracy, but because of the nature of the naval missions themselves. The 
multinational naval cooperation in the Gulf of Aden may represent the future for navies, both 
because it overcomes the problem of ‘sea-blindness’ (the current focus of most Western 
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militaries on ground troops)
 (Gerard 2009) and because of the high degree of international 
cooperation and coordination the naval missions represent.   
  In this section, we probe the success of counter-piracy in two steps. First, we 
undertake a brief qualitative assessment of counter-piracy. Are navies achieving the goals 
they set out for themselves? Second, we confirm the insights of this assessment through 
quantitative analysis of the data available on piracy. 
2.1.  Qualitative assessment of counter-piracy 
 One way to assess the success of counter-piracy is to examine the criteria of the naval 
operations themselves. The EU naval mission, Operation Atalanta, has three main goals: 1) 
“the protection of vessels of the World Food Program (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced 
persons in Somalia”, 2) the “protection of vulnerable vessels” transiting through the area, and 
3) to “bring an end to acts of piracy and armed robbery” in the region (EU Provides Long-
Term Protection for WFP Lifeline to Somalia 2008; EU Anti-Piracy Naval Mission 
Successful 2009).
13 
The naval mission appears to be an unqualified success in relation to food aid.  A 
naval escort system was implemented in November 2007 in order to ensure food aid reached 
Somalia, allowing the WFP to scale up its operations. A total of 620,000 metric tons of food 
was safely delivered since the implementation of naval protection in November 2007 (United 
Nations World Food Program - Somalia/Operations). 
To achieve the second aim of protecting shipping, naval forces use a variety of tactics. 
The first is to advise ship-owners about security measures to minimize the risk of attacks, 
such as speed and route of travel, evasive actions and securing decks with barbed wire 
(Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa). Secondly, ships are advised to travel through the 
Gulf of Aden in a specific transit corridor, the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
(IRTC). Ships contact Operation Atalanta and are given a recommended time to enter the 
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transit corridor, and a speed at which to travel. Naval vessels patrol the area, spaced out along 
the corridor so that they are always relatively close to commercial shipping.  Ships that come 
under attack can request assistance from naval vessels, though there is no guarantee that 
assistance will be rendered in time to prevent pirates from boarding.
14 Once pirates have 
boarded a ship, the naval forces generally do not intervene to avoid risking the lives of the 
crew or endangering the cargo (Harper 2008; Sörenson 2008).
15 
The success of the above measures in protecting vulnerable shipping is debatable. On 
the one hand the IMB reports dozens of attacks abandoned at the arrival of naval ships and 
helicopters.
16 On the other hand many pirates were not deterred from trying their luck right 
under the noses of the navies: according to the statistics compiled by the International 
Maritime Board (IMB), 218 attacks occurred in the Gulf of Aden between February 2009 and 
the end of December 2010, and 29 of these were successful. 
17 Senior Royal Navy officers 
involved with Operation Atalanta assert that there have been only three attacks on ships using 
the transit corridor as advised by Atalanta officials and that preventive measures put in place 
by ship owners do deter attacks of piracy.
18  Naval officials argue that most recent attacks 
occurred on ships that chose not to use the transit corridor system and did not make the 
alterations recommended to save time or money.
19 
The naval mission’s third aim is to bring Somali piracy to an end.  Three main tactics 
have been used in pursuit of this goal: the detention and trial of pirates caught in the act of 
piracy; the use of naval vessels to aid attacked ships; and the confiscation of pirates’ 
equipment.  
The detention and trial of captured pirates has four main problems. Firstly, the 
financial desirability of piracy means that recruiting new pirates to replace those arrested is 
easy (Hunter 2008). Secondly, pirates might actually seek to be arrested in order to gain 
political asylum, either immediately or after serving a sentence, a concern shared by Western 
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powers.
20 Thirdly, trying pirates is difficult.  Somalia’s deficient legal system makes local 
trials impossible (Treves 2009, 399-414), and an agreement to try pirates in Kenya stopped in 
April 2010.
21  Fourthly, the burden of proof required for a conviction is high and the shipping 
industry is reluctant to produce witnesses because it is costly to do so in an industry where 
‘time is money’.
22  Therefore several trials have collapsed or have resulted in the release of 
suspects.
23 Accordingly pirate arrests are now derisively called ‘catch and release’ (Ungoed-
Thomas and Woolf 2009). It is widely recognized that arresting and trying pirates will not 
have a significant deterrent impact on Somali piracy.
24 Destroying equipment during an arrest 
will have a limited effect because of the low cost of arms and technology like GPS.  
Finally, the use of the transit corridor is meant to deter pirate activity by making it 
substantially more difficult to successfully attack the shipping passing through the region and 
aid navies in catching pirates.  We now examine whether such deterrence has in fact taken 
place. 
2.2.  The Model 
We model the monthly number of pirate attacks carried out by Somali pirates between 
January 2000 and December 2010 according to the IMB annual piracy reports. We also split 
these into attacks carried out in the Gulf of Aden and in the wider Somali Basin. The series 
are depicted in diagram 1. Our model includes the following explanatory variables. First, we 
have three variables exploring the business practices of Somali piracy. We test whether pirate 
businesses continue over time (using a lagged dependent variable) and reinvest their profits 
(we include past successful hijacks with several lags to take into account the length of ransom 
negotiations). We also include a dummy variable for seasonal effects: risk-averse businesses 
might avoid periods of high winds during the monsoon seasons.
25 
Secondly, we include a number of proxies for the stability of the land-side business 
environment in Somalia.
26 We use the number of regional markets monitored by the Food 
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Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit in Somalia in which the food staple “red rice” was not 
traded as a proxy for the impact of local conflict on supply lines (Food Security and Nutriton 
Analysis Unit - Somalia). We use the proportion of pre civil-war stations under contract with 
the weather monitoring network SWALIM as a proxy for the feasibility of entering into arms-
length contracts (for supply and security services in the case of the pirates).
27 The FAO world 
food price index is included to test whether increased poverty in Somalia (which is largely 
dependent on food imports) drives more people into piracy or whether it improves the returns 
from agricultural activities and thereby reduces piracy. We use a dummy for the period of the 
UIC advance June to December 2006 and the Al Shabaab territorial gains from April 2010 as 
a measure of the impact of territorial contests along the Puntland coast (Hobyo was captured 
in 2006 and Gharardeere in 2006 and 2010).  
Thirdly, we include a dummy variable from April 2008 to test whether there were 
significant changes in the pirates’ operating environment when the collapse of the Puntland 
authorities’ budget removed the threat of land-side counter-piracy enforcement through 
security forces (Hansen 2009). We assume that as pirate ransoms are a multiple of the 
government budget (70mn vs 17.6mn in 2009) pirates have been able to buy off the relevant 
authorities from this point onwards. Finally, we include two dummies for the naval 
intervention: the initial Maritime Patrol Area along the Yemeni Coast from August 2008 to 
January 2009 and the IRTC from February 2009.
28 
Given concerns about possible under-reporting of acts of piracy before 2008 and 
potential over-reporting thereafter, we log the dependent variable to de-emphasise the large 
number of reported attacks after the naval deployment relative to the period before. We use a 
Tobit model to reflect that the dependent variable is not normally distributed. If piracy is not 
sufficiently attractive in a particular month we observe no attacks, so the variable is left-
censored at zero.
29    The results are summarised in tables 1 and 2, summary statistics for all 
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the non-dummy variables are reported in table 3. We show both the full models including all 
variables and restricted models obtained by step-wise deletion of statistically insignificant 
variables.
30 The final preferred specifications maintain most of the explanatory power of the 
full models.  
2.3.  Quantitative assessment of counter-piracy 
The only maritime intervention variables that are statistically significant show a 
positive effect of the maritime patrol area on pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden. This naval 
initiative served pirates well by concentrating and slowing down shipping in a dog-legged 
corridor while naval forces were too few in number to provide effective cover. This was 
realised by naval commands and the counterproductive effect was remedied in the IRTC. 
However, despite the reduced success rate in the Gulf of Aden, successful attacks still took 
place in and outside the transit corridor. Overall pirate activity appears to not to have been 
significantly influenced by the presence of the naval forces. 
   The evidence that counter-piracy efforts have improved the delivery of food aid to 
Somalia (but at the cost of three multinational naval missions) is convincing; however, it does 
not appear that extensive naval counter-piracy efforts have had a deterrent impact on piracy. 
The main effect seems to have been to move piracy further away from Somalia’s shores 
(UNITAR Operational Satellite Applications Programme 2009). Even in the Straits of 
Malacca, where piracy has been drastically reduced, this reduction has had little to do with 
naval patrols and in fact has occurred because of the devastation caused by the Asian tsunami 
in 2004 and political changes within Indonesia itself, and, less notably, air patrols over a 
much smaller area of ocean than in the Indian Ocean (Raymond 2009, 37). If naval 
operations have not succeeded in deterring pirates, it suggests that the pirate problems of 
Somalia will require a land-based solution, which we analyse further in the following section.  
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3. Somali piracy, disorder, and stability  
  In the introduction we set out some of the many arguments that solving Somalia’s 
pirate problem will require an effective solution to the problems caused by the absence of 
governmental structures in Somalia. The prevalent opinion is that piracy thrives on 
lawlessness and disorder (Murphy 2007). However, our results suggest that pirates benefit 
from improvements in the contracting environment that allow them to ‘do business.’ This 
seems to be especially true for piracy expeditions in the Somali Basin, where pirates are at 
sea (often without means of communication) for weeks and therefore need to make a decision 
based on long-term indicators of stability. Short-term disruptions to business and trade such 
as those picked up by our “missing markets” proxy have a negative effect on pirate activity in 
the Gulf of Aden, which can react more rapidly to changes inland. This contradicts the 
common assertion that pirates thrive on domestic chaos. Instead the suggested interpretation 
is that pirates need an infrastructure and contract security: hostages need to be fed, kept in 
reasonable condition and under the pirates’ control for ransoming.  
In all our models civil strife reduces piracy (we often have a highly significant 
negative coefficient for the UIC dummy), contradicting the hypothesis that pirates benefit 
from disorder. Outbreaks of civil unrest disrupt food supplies and raise the cost of guarding 
hostages from other groups who could extract ransoms. Alternatively, with a limited supply 
of weapons, warlords might deploy their armed men either in piracy or in battles over 
resources on land. During the UIC period piracy was banned under sharia law. There were 
threats that any captured ships would be freed and traditional pirate ports were invaded by 
UIC militias. Unsurprisingly during this period of turmoil, unrest and uncertainty pirates had 
no guarantee that they would see any gains from successful hijacks and piracy stopped for a 
number of months.
31 
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We argue, therefore, that on a continuum between highly unstable (war and conflict) 
and very stable (a fully functional state) there is a large ‘sweet spot’ where piracy can 
flourish. While total disorder is bad for piracy, moderate order is better than moderate 
disorder for the pirate business. If the political situation deteriorates into violence and 
extreme instability pirates will be too busy either acting as land-based militia, or protecting 
themselves, to continue pirate activities.
32 
The evolution of Somali piracy, as reflected in our data, demonstrates some potential 
parameters of the sweet spot for piracy. Piracy during the early 2000s was a pure extortion 
business, where pirates ‘fined’ ships for their presence and sent them on their way. This 
required no stability for contracting or long-term investment. Throughout this period our 
business environment measures indicate that economic development was thwarted by lack of 
trust, roving bandits and outbreaks of local conflict, meaning that business of all types were 
struggling. In January 2005 less than a third of water stations had been re-contracted, but 
thereafter it rapidly became easier to ‘do business’ in Somalia and work around instability 
when it occurred. From a business perspective hijack and ransom piracy might have taken off 
earlier, if it had not been for the disruption caused by the UIC period in 2006 and the 
struggles over possession of Las Anood between Puntland and Somaliland during 2007.
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4. Piracy is an organized criminal business  
The idea that there should be a ‘land-based’ solution to piracy is a catch-all phrase 
without much discussion of what type of land-based problem piracy is, and accordingly, what 
land-based policy (if any) will have an impact. The difficulty with Somali piracy is that 
despite its relatively unsophisticated methods, its business structure is complex. Pirates are 
organized criminals, not come-by-chance robbers. Somali piracy has echoes of mafias like 
those in Sicily and Russia. If pirates are organized criminals, then this will have a significant 
impact on many of the available ‘land-based’ solutions to the problem. This section will first 
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make the argument that piracy constitutes fairly sophisticated organized crime, then argue 
that this type of organization requires a degree of stability to thrive, and finally point out the 
challenges that such organization poses for any ‘land-based’ solution to piracy.  
4.1.  Piracy as organized crime/business 
   Pirates are not opportunistic criminals. This is reflected in our result that piracy is not 
driven by rising food insecurity (caused by rising international food prices). If anything, 
piracy is reduced when food imports become more expensive, creating alternative business 
opportunities in the agricultural sector. In fact, poor Somalis are not able to raise the 
resources (weapons, motors for boats, telecommunications) to mount successful piracy 
expeditions.  Somali piracy clearly contains elements of organized crime. Criminal 
organizations can be defined as “organisations that have durability, hierarchy, and 
involvement in a multiplicity of criminal activities” and further take over some of the 
functions of government (Hill 2006, 8).
34 
Durability  
The durability of Somali piracy is clear, given its intransigence in the face of 
significant attempts to control it, and the fact that although pirate incidents over the past 10 
years have ebbed and flowed, it has not come close to disappearing. The only real challenge 
to piracy was the UIC period in 2006 as shown above. Somali piracy has been unaffected by 
(admittedly ineffectual) arrests and seizures, suggesting that there are enough potential pirates 
and pirate material to fill gaps caused by captured pirates or equipment. 
We note four aspects of durability: first, in the patience required of pirates; second, in 
the ability of pirates to innovate; third, in the reinvestment of profits back into the pirate 
business, and fourth, in the use of foreign investment in piracy. 
  Piracy requires considerable patience and confidence in both the long-term existence 
of the pirate gang and the continuation of optimal conditions for piracy. After a vessel is 
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captured, pirates wait for several months for the ransom to be agreed and delivered, and this 
waiting period seems to be increasing as pirates drive ransoms higher and higher. 
Pirates have also been able to innovate.  One noticeable difference since 2009’s 
implementation of the IRTC has been the willingness and ability of pirates to attack far 
offshore, well into the Indian Ocean. The Royal Navy has noted the use of larger and better 
equipped motherships, which supply smaller vessels operating at some distance from shore, 
connected by satellite phones and GPS. These smaller vessels wait near known shipping 
routes, sometimes for days, to attack vessels. These attacks are better planned and less 
opportunistic than those immediately off Somalia’s coast.
35 Innovation occurs because 
pirates are committed to the business in the long-term and cannot simply give up; moreover, 
the change in practice requires more patience and discipline among pirates working far 
offshor
ause pirates wait on average 3-4 months for a 
ransom
e. 
A further piece of evidence suggesting that pirate activities are well-coordinated and 
rely on confidence in the long-term prospects of the situation is the fact that pirates reinvest 
their profits. Pirates themselves can invest in an operation (a pirate can provide himself and a 
gun, or a skiff), as can other investors. There are different classes of payments in the event of 
a successful ransom, calculated against the type and size of investment or nature of 
participation (UN Security Council 2010, 99). Bossasso's police chief, Osman Hassan Uke 
argues that: "Whenever 10 guys get paid ransom money, 20 more pirates are created" 
(Harding 2009). Our data suggests that there is an upsurge in attacks five months after a 
successful attack, and we argue that this is bec
 to arrive and then reinvest the profits. 
 It is also possible to invest in Somali piracy from overseas, suggesting that it is not 
only pirates who have long-term confidence in the contracting environment and the survival 
of the pirate business. There is even a pirate stock exchange in the pirate hotspot of 
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Gharadheere, where enterprises can be listed and investors can invest (Dealbook 2009). 
Furthermore, the idea that the Somali diaspora can invest through informal financial 
exchange channels is an ‘open secret’ in the Canadian Somali community (Bridger 2011). 
Clearly, there is enough governance in the area to allow sophisticated investment and enough 
trust in the stability of the system that investors will be paid back.    
Hiera
ough trust in the contracting environment to facilitate substantial 
paymen
rchy 
There is considerable evidence indicating the hierarchical nature of Somali piracy. 
Within a pirate gang, different individuals perform different functions, and receive different 
levels of payment from ransom payout (Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 1811 (2008)). Moreover, piracy is a business that relies 
heavily on sub-contracting. Every task associated with piracy is contracted out: guarding 
hostages, providing hostages with food, and ransom negotiations are all performed by pirate 
subcontractors.
36  These services are provided “in anticipation of reimbursement, with a 
significant margin of profit” when the ransom is paid (UN Security Council 2010, 99). In 
other words, there is en
t after the fact.  
Another sign of the hierarchical nature of Somali piracy is its relative non-violence. 
Of course pirates use violence against hostages, but until recently this has been limited. When 
ships are taken there is an understanding that the crew will give themselves up rather than 
defend the ship.
37 Some news articles claim that no hostages have ever been harmed by 
pirates (Williams 2008; Bahadur 2009). However, the International Maritime Bureau reports 
that during the 217 incidents involving Somali pirates in 2009 (during which 867 hostages 
were taken), 10 crew members were wounded and 4 were killed (ICC International Maritime 
Bureau 2010, 21). On closer inspection it appears that Western hostages receive the best 
treatment, as they command the highest ransoms (Carney 2009). Western casualties seem to 
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have occurred only accidentally, due to indiscriminate firing during the boarding of ships or 
during rescue attempts (Bremner 2009), though rough treatment may be used to create 
pressure when negotiations are stalled (Carney 2009; Jones 2010). The four Americans killed 
by Somali pirates in February 2011 may be an anomaly, or they may demonstrate what 
happens when the ‘rules’ of the game are not followed: information about what sparked pirate 
violence in this case is limited but the pirates were being pursued by the US Navy while 
negotia
iminals as a group have an interest in moderating the behaviour of all” (Hill 
2006, 1
 (Raymond 2009). In Somalia, focus 
on rans
to the hierarchy of existing clan structures in Puntland (Hansen 2009; UN Security Council 
tions were occurring (Sciutto and Hopper 2011).  
 Even more surprising is the fact that there is very little pirate-on-pirate violence; for 
example, one pirate group kidnapping the hostages of another.
38 This suggests that pirate 
activity is coordinated to a considerable degree. Hill argues that gangs “develop supra-gang 
mechanisms for cooperation and the avoidance of conflict” and that “if crime is centrally 
coordinated, cr
7-18). 
Pirate behaviour in Somalia appears to be moderated by an agreed set of rules for 
conduct. The idea that there is a pirate ‘code of conduct’ or that all parties follow the rules of 
the game, which largely excludes violence, came up repeatedly during our interviews.
39 
Captured pirates have apparently referred to a written code of conduct that bans mistreatment 
of (Western) hostages (Leveque 2008).
40  Pirates have also claimed in interviews with 
Western media that they do not harm or mistreat hostages (Querouil 2008; Cawthorne 2009). 
The main reason for the relative non-violence of Somali piracy is likely to be that it is a 
ransom-based business. In the Straits of Malacca, pirates have little incentive to keep the 
crews alive because they are interested in ships and cargo
oming hostages means that piracy is less violent. 
Finally, Somali piracy’s hierarchy is facilitated by the fact that it has been grafted on 
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2010, 99) which in turn may provide further explanation for why piracy is durable and 
relatively non-violent.  
Multiplicity of criminal activities 
Somali piracy is composed of many different types of crime. From the initial kidnap 
of crew and theft of the cargo, through to the illegal activity that must support a ransom 
business (holding victims captive, charging and receiving ransoms, threat of or use of actual 
violence), piracy requires a host of criminal behaviours. It is not easy to find ways in which 
piracy has organized other criminal business, given that the line between legal and extralegal 
behaviour is necessarily blurred in countries where government and enforcement mechanisms 
are weak. However, there is evidence to suggest that that the money piracy has brought into 
Puntland has also brought with it prostitution and drug use (Hunter 2008), although it is not 
certain whether or not pirates have attempted to control these related criminal activities. 
  The governmental functions provided by piracy are, simply, revenue and jobs. Pirate 
ransoms find their way to Puntland state and local government coffers (UN Security Council 
2010, 37). The Puntland authorities’ tax base is weak and underdeveloped, being based 
almost solely on customs receipts from Bosasso port.
41 This barely covers the bill for the 
governments’ security forces, and only 3% of the official budget is dedicated to social 
expenditure (Samantar and Leonard 2010). Despite this, Peter Leeson shows significant 
progress in Somalia’s development indicators (Leeson 2007). 
  Why solutions for organized crime are tricky 
  Somali piracy, then, shares many of the features of organized criminal behaviour seen 
elsewhere. The idea that organized criminal behaviour does not flourish in an environment of 
total anarchy is not surprising to analysts of organized crime (Gambetta 1996; Hill 2006; 
Varese 2001, 2006). For an organized criminal business to have hierarchy, durability, and 
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diversification the environment must be relatively stable. It cannot be a “Hobbesian 
underworld” where criminals operate as their own enforcers (Hill 2006, 12). 
  Unfortunately, organized crime, particularly stable organized crime (in other words, a 
criminal group which has established a durable monopoly on crime) is notoriously difficult to 
control, and the strength, capacity, or centralization of the state seems to have no bearing on 
whether or not control will be successful. Hill became interested in the Japanese yakuza 
because of the puzzle posed by “clearly identifiable criminal gangs operating openly within a 
society widely regarded as one of the industrialised world’s most crime-free societies" (Hill 
2006, 1). Even in very strong states, organized crime can flourish. This is because 
governments and criminal organizations can actually exist in symbiosis. 
  Symbiosis is more likely to occur (in weak and strong states alike) when organized 
criminal activity minimizes violence and provides public goods. Hill (2006, 33) (quoting 
Schelling (1984, 173) argues that  
the government must accept that it does not have a total monopoly of power and must 
therefore come to terms with other power groups. On the other side organized crime 
groups will tend to adopt codes of practice (i.e. not killing police officers) that avoid 
their coming into direct confrontation with law-enforcement. This need not imply any 
cordiality between the two parties; it can be likened to two powers locked in a 
military confrontation having a tacit understanding as to the ‘limitation of war . . . and 
the delineation of spheres of influence.’ 
 
In other words, there can be little incentive for governments to alter criminal businesses that 
do not cause excessive violence. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate most types of crime. Even the most 
orderly of states still has criminal activity. Criminal businesses can flourish inside a strong 
state (as do yakuza in Japan, or drugs businesses in parts of the United States). They can also 
succeed in strong states with high degrees of corruption (in other words, where criminal 
business can ‘capture’ crucial organs of the state and use them to facilitate business), as is the 
case with mafias in Russia and Italy. 
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    Somali piracy’s resemblance to organized crime means that it will be similarly 
difficult to control, especially considering the weakness of the Somali state and increasing 
‘capture’ of local authorities. Hill notes that there is little incentive to enforce laws involving 
“victimless transactions between consenting adults” (Hill 2006, 34). Somali piracy is not 
victimless (Hurlburt 2011), but crucially, its victims are not members of the community. The 
impact upon the community (as argued in more detail below) is largely positive. Local 
authorities have little incentive to clamp down on pirate behaviour, given that it does not 
victimize the community. 
In Somalia, stable symbiosis has included pirates, local authorities, and even 
international authorities. Puntland is becoming increasingly corrupted by the proceeds of 
piracy. Menkhaus (2009, 24) argues that “the fact that ransom money touches so many hands 
in northeastern and central Somalia creates a serious disincentive on the part of leaders of 
those regions to address the problem...the autonomous state of Puntland in northeast Somalia 
is becoming a pirate version of a narco-state.” The UN monitoring group in the area notes 
that the administration of General Abdirahman Mohamed ‘Faroole’ is “nudging Puntland in 
the direction of becoming a criminal State” with several key officials receiving payments 
from piracy (UN Security Council 2010, 39). 
Our evidence demonstrates that Puntland’s governmental structures have been 
subverted by pirate-financed corruption. The “captured government” variable is statistically 
significant in all the preferred model specifications
42 showing that there was a major 
breakthrough for piracy at the point when the Puntland government lost its grip on its budget 
and ceased paying its security forces in April 2008 (Hansen 2009). This resulted in an 
explosion of crime in Puntland, including piracy. Even when the Puntland government 
resumed paying its forces, corruption had become entrenched. With police officers earning 
less than $50 a month, successful pirates can buy off local forces if they cannot avoid them 
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altogether. Occasional arrests and detentions are easily resolved with a small bribe and 
backhanders ensure good relations with the Puntland administration. Pirate enterprises 
(especially those with clan links to the Puntland government) have therefore been able to 
operate mostly with impunity.
43 Even if Puntland authorities thought that piracy was 
undesirable (and given its victimless nature, this is unlikely), they are being paid off to 
prevent any enforcement. 
Organized criminals can also achieve a symbiotic relationship with the state by 
providing a public good, either explicitly on behalf of the state or by simply filling a vacuum 
left by the state (Varese 2006, 412). Providing a public good buys the support of the local 
community, and in some cases, facilitates symbiosis with the state (by limiting violence and 
providing a quasi-state function within a criminal sphere). Usually the sorts of goods criminal 
organizations provide are related to protection, dispute settlement, or informal loans (Varese 
2006, 412). In the Somali case, as argued above, the pirates are providing the one public good 
neither the state itself nor the international community has been able to provide: jobs, and the 
money necessary to create a local economy that would not exist without piracy. 
The sort of violence-limiting symbiotic behaviour Hill describes in relation to 
organized crime groups in other contexts may be occurring between the international 
community (as represented by multinational naval missions) and the pirates in Somalia. 
Pirate violence and behaviour is limited by ‘codes of conduct’, and a situation much like the 
one Hill describes has resulted: pirates limit their violence against Western hostages (most of 
the navies they encounter are Western). It is very much like there are two sides each 
recognizing spheres of influence. There have been few calls to use military forces to tackle 
Somali piracy on land (despite near-universal agreement that piracy is a land-based problem) 
and even recognition from Western military leaders that eradicating piracy is probably 
impossible. Commodore Simon Williams of the UK Ministry of Defense argues that 
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“because piracy is rather similar to any form of crime, getting to zero is a very, very difficult 
thing to do. Getting to a minimum acceptable level is probably the closest that one can get” 
(International Institution for Strategic Studies 2008). One problem with controlling piracy is 
that pirates may not be crossing enough lines to make them worthy of land-based control 
efforts, which would be costly in financial terms and in terms of violence. If pirates were 
more violent, or victimized the local community, or stepped outside their own codes of 
conduct, we might then see more incentives to end piracy. The next section examines further 
how the symbiotic nature of Somali piracy means that no side has a genuine incentive to alter 
their practices.  
The organized criminal nature of Somali piracy severely limits the utility of two 
potential solutions to the pirate problem. First, rebuilding the Somali state may not do 
anything to end the problems of piracy for two reasons: strong states can coexist perfectly 
effectively with organized crime and pirates could capture (and are capturing) nascent state 
structures, and in addition a strong Somali state might well be an Islamist state, which would 
not be high on the list of desirable outcomes for the international community. Second, 
aggressively attacking pirates on land to reduce piracy at sea may not have the intended 
effects. This solution, which is problematic for reasons outlined further below, may disrupt 
the relatively non-violent behaviour of pirates and turn them more violent by breaking the 
‘code of conduct’ that facilitates symbiosis. Moreover, violent solutions to other types of 
organized criminal activity have not been especially effective, and could draw the 
international community into an undefined ‘war on piracy’ with the same success rates as the 
‘war on drugs’.  
5. Symbiosis at work: skewed incentives 
The players on the Somali pirate stage (from the pirates, to the shipping companies, to 
international navies) may be in a symbiotic state, where there are few incentives for anyone 
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involved in any aspect of piracy – whether perpetrating it or attempting to control it – to alter 
what they are doing.  The idea that only repairing Somalia will solve the Somali pirate 
problem contributes substantially to many of these difficulties. This section addresses how 
incentives for multinational naval forces, the shipping industry, pirates, and local 
governments all work against potentially effective solutions for counter-piracy and may exist 
symbiotically. 
5.1.  Multinational naval forces 
  The stakes for success in counter-piracy are high for many of the world’s navies.  
Naval officials point out that counter-piracy work is an excellent way of overcoming ‘sea 
blindness.’
44 In recent years the public profile of land forces has greatly superseded that of 
naval forces, assisted by the fact that both Iraq and Afghanistan have been land-based 
operations not requiring much naval expertise. Success for the world’s navies in Somalia 
demonstrates their continued importance and hence the importance of continued naval 
funding. 
  For Operation Atalanta, the stakes of success are perhaps the highest. Military 
cooperation within the EU has been an oft-asserted and never achieved goal of the 
organization. Atalanta represents a singular success.
45 Nicolas Sarkozy, during France’s 
presidency of the EU, was one of Atalanta’s main advocates and it seems certain that EU 
support for the mission will continue. 
  Navies, then, have a large incentive to undertake counter-piracy operations. However, 
it could be argued that navies have defined counter-piracy missions in such a way that 
‘success’ is inevitable and significant change unlikely to result. If navies repeatedly argue 
that they can control or limit Somali piracy, but cannot end it because it is ultimately a land-
based problem, then all navies have to do to show that they are successful is hinder rather 
than end piracy. If piracy continues, navies will be able to say that they do not have the 
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resources to end the Somalia problem, and that the failure is then not the failure of naval 
missions, but the failure of broader policy.  
  It is likewise important to note that if this logic is correct, it makes much less sense to 
actually attempt to create a land-based solution, by force, via aid, or otherwise.  Put simply, it 
seems quite likely that any attempts to build a more effective Somali state will either fail 
entirely or take many years to come to fruition.  Navies need counter-piracy to be successful 
and the European Union needs to demonstrate continued success in military cooperation. 
Broadening counter-piracy to include rebuilding Somalia would be very likely lead to failure.
  Some commentators suggest that a more forceful military solution might bring an end 
to Somali piracy. Some EU member states likewise would be keen for more aggressive action 
against pirates.
46 Chasing pirates to their strongholds, this argument runs, would provide a 
much more significant deterrent.  There are two problems with this approach. First, it is not 
clear that the international community would support repeated incursions into Somali 
territory to deal with pirates. Second, Somali piracy is relatively bloodless. All parties 
involved know the rules of the game, and violence is not commonly used.  A more violent 
approach dealing with pirates may make pirates more violent in dealing with hostages, as 
may have been the case during the 2011 episode where the passengers on an American yacht 
were killed by pirates under pursuit from the US Navy. 
5.2.  The shipping and insurance industries 
  The shipping industry represents perhaps the largest obstacle to ending piracy. Piracy 
simply does not affect enough ships in the region to convince ship owners that it is 
economically viable to institute even the cheapest of changes across the board.  
  It is important to remember that piracy only affects a tiny percentage of shipping 
through Somalia’s coastal waters and the Indian Ocean. Of an estimated 30,000 ships 
transiting the Gulf of Aden in 2009, 116 were attacked, less than one in 250. Moreover, the 
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final ransoms are still only a small fraction of the overall value of the ship, crew and cargo.
47 
Ship-owners have chosen to play the odds: it is cheaper to take out insurance than to pay for 
the type of safeguards advocated by multinational naval missions. Atalanta officials estimate 
that 80% of ships choose to use the IRTC.
48 The remaining 20% are reluctant to slow down 
their journey and wait for an approved time and prefer to take their chances. Many ship 
owners are choosing not to spend the money to institute even the cheapest of practices 
recommended by the navy, like putting barbed wire on ships. 
  The low probability of a pirate attack, combined with the willingness of ship owners 
to gamble that they will not be attacked, partially explains why ships do not defend 
themselves against pirates. In addition, having armed security guards on a ship is costly, and 
has potential legal ramifications (guards would have to declare their weapons at every port of 
call, where they may be impounded).  Arming the crew is another possibility. However, a risk 
analyst who deals with Somali pirates draws the analogy that arming the crew would be like 
arming bank tellers in response to armed robbery, placing the responsibility on the crew. 
Moreover, he argues that it would be exceptionally dangerous for a crew of an oil tanker to 
engage with pirates and then be hit by a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. Given that piracy 
is currently not particularly violent, most crew (particularly when hired on short contracts and 
on low pay) would prefer to give themselves up and wait for a ransom to be paid rather than 
risk firing on pirates.
49 
  Two policy solutions might persuade the shipping industry to alter its practices. The 
first is to force insurance companies to require ship owners to adopt safeguards. Using 
insurance to affect behavior has been implemented in other contexts.  In the private security 
sector in the UK, the insurance industry is not prepared to offer cover “unless recognizable 
and enforceable standards are instituted upon the basis of which insurers can assess risk and 
set premiums” (Zedner 2006, 276). Similar standard setting, which would include taking 
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counter-piracy measures, could be set up for the shipping industry. However, this would 
require internationally binding legislation, as insurance firms could circumvent such 
legislation by selling hijack and ransom cover through foreign subsidiaries. 
  Insurance companies, although they have to pay out ransoms, can make considerable 
profits due to their ability to raise premiums for piracy, which is still very rare. It is therefore 
not in their interest for piracy to stop altogether. So-called risk analysts and companies that 
provide services in ransom negotiation also do very well out of Somali piracy.  As one senior 
naval officer remarked, “this is a business where everyone makes money” – not just pirates. 
The cost of the ransom is in the region of only a fifth of the total costs arising from the 
average successful hijack.
50 Piracy is therefore not just profitable in Somalia, but creates 
opportunities for businesses around the world; thereby further reducing incentives to bring 
piracy to an end.
51 
Another potential solution is to make the paying of ransoms illegal. This would 
require coordinated international legal action, but could potentially ruin the pirate business. It 
is not clear, however, that it would be possible to create or enforce such a law internationally. 
Currently, ransom negotiators evade strong British regulations by conducting the ransom 
negotiations abroad. 
5.3.  Local communities 
  Piracy harms outsiders, not insiders. Unlike other types of organized crime, which 
prey on members of the community in order to make a profit, piracy’s victims are all external 
to Somalia. Moreover, piracy is profitable for many in Puntland, providing jobs and 
investment capital, raising local wages and alleviating poverty through redistribution of 
profits in the wider clan (Shortland 2011). Accordingly, there is little incentive for local 
Somalis to end piracy.  
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5.4.  Pirates 
  Pirates themselves obviously have no incentive to end what is a lucrative, and, 
importantly, a relatively safe business. The possibility of arrest is both unlikely and 
potentially desirable, as it might carry with it a ticket out of Somalia.
52 The use of violence is 
rare, meaning that pirates do not take significant personal risks compared to those 
encountered in daily life in Somalia. The financial rewards are significant.  Ending piracy in 
Somalia faces the crucial obstacle of finding alternative forms of employment for the 5,000 
or so Somalis directly employed in the pirate business as well as those who rely upon them.  
The fact that piracy “works” for the local community and the difficulty of otherwise 
employing pirates is therefore an important stumbling block to building the kind of 
significant stability in Somalia that would allow the state to end piracy. Somalia is a long way 
away from being able to produce a similarly lucrative legitimate industry. This demonstrates 
further that a Somali state (or local state) with the capability to end piracy may nonetheless 
not wish to end piracy.   
6. Conclusion 
  Our analysis of Somali piracy does not provide a rosy policy picture. The nature of 
Somali piracy – the fact it is land-based, and a clear manifestation of organized crime – 
means that it will be hard to control from the sea but perhaps no easier to control on land, 
even if the Somali state (or even Puntland) grew stronger. We cannot offer many effective 
policy prescriptions that would have a dramatic effect on piracy in Somalia, but it is vital to 
be realistic about the prospects of ending piracy in Somalia. It is hard to imagine how the 
incentives for criminal business, the state, and other international players existing in a 
symbiotic relationship could be altered.   
Given that the policy options for Somali piracy are few, and contain many pitfalls, it 
might be most helpful to conclude by outlining the largest obstacles to resolving piracy rather 
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than proposing solutions. These obstacles are what stand in the way of reducing piracy off the 
coast of Somalia to occasional criminal behaviour. The first, and most serious, obstacle is the 
lack of alternate employment at similar financial levels for pirates. To have a noticeable 
impact, any policy prescription would have to find something else for pirates to do given how 
easy it is to become a pirate. Alternate employment would have to be accompanied by 
significant disincentives for piracy, although providing a disincentive to an activity which has 
significant financial gain in a situation as desperate as Somalia will be difficult. 
  The second obstacle to ending or severely limiting piracy in Somalia is the problem 
posed by corruption. Examining piracy and organized crime in other contexts demonstrates 
that considering state weakness as the main variable is a red herring: ‘strong’ states like Italy 
and Russia can have significant organized crime elements, and even strong states regarded as 
well governed, like Japan, suffer from organized criminal behaviour. The key task is to limit 
the degree to which relevant officials are corrupt and can be corrupted. However, the 
relationship between statebuilding and corruption is complex, and it is very difficult to build 
state institutions without at the same time building up criminal capacity (Cheng and Zaum, 
forthcoming). Somalia is at a crucial juncture in this regard: the further Puntland travels down 
the track of becoming a pirate-state, the harder it will be to stamp out piracy in the region. 
  The fact that piracy is ‘victimless’ is a third obstacle to its disappearance. If a local 
community sees a reason to refuse to participate or support criminal activity, it can have an 
impact on attempts to reduce it. This impulse is likely to remain absent in Somalia. To make 
matters worse, the external ‘victims’ of piracy – the hostages – are principally sailors on 
commercial ships who come from nations without much ability to advocate for their release. 
These hostages are not headline news: the rare occasions when British or American yacht 
owners are taken get media attention and spur governmental action. Savvy pirates would 
simply stop attacking these ships and focus on commercial shipping, trusting in the fact that 
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these hijackings are lower profile. A spate of attacks on Western ships or crew would force a 
stronger international response. 
  As our analysis demonstrates, a fifth major obstacle to ending Somali piracy is that it 
is a land-based problem that manifests at sea, and imposing land-based solutions on a state 
with significant internal problems will be difficult. Clearly, naval missions cannot ever really 
‘end’ Somali piracy, but there are few alternatives short of a comprehensive and uncorrupted 
statebuilding project that might take generations, or a violent incursion into pirate territory. 
Piracy crosses the boundaries between land and sea, but also between war and crime, thus 
making it harder to devise an appropriate policy response. 
  Finally, perhaps the most obdurate obstacle to ending Somali piracy is presented by 
shipowners and insurers. As long as it is financially viable for shipowners to run the risks 
associated with not following international naval advice or taking counter-measures, and as 
long as insurance payouts continue to be less than the profits made through premiums, pirates 
will continue to be an issue. Unprotected shipping off the Somali coast is a bit like driving an 
open truck filled with money through a dangerous neighbourhood: it is true that stamping out 
crime and stopping criminals is the responsibility of local police, but it is also true that 
securing the money and deterring attack is part of the solution. Piracy is only possible 
because shipping is unprotected. 
  While these obstacles are significant, it is important to recognize that Somali piracy is 
organized criminal activity, and this may open up further avenues of research and lead to 
more effective policy prescriptions. Violently pursuing organized criminals in other contexts 
has not been a successful strategy, but it is worth examining how other organized crime 
groups have been stopped or had their activities reduced. Piracy also has clear echoes of other 
types of international crime stemming from relatively ungoverned spaces, like the trade in 
opium in Afghanistan, and poses a similar set of obstacles. Focusing clearly on the nature of 
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Total Acts of Piracy Committed by Somali Pirates 
Attacks t-1 0.365***   
(0.1352)    
0.463*** 
(0.108)      
0.418***    
(0.100)     
Successt-1  0.022    
(0.044)      
  
Successt-2 -0.023 
(0.039)   
  
Successt-3 -0.072 
(0.041)    
  
Successt-4 -0.011 
(0.040)     
  
Successt-5 0.050 
(0.040)      
0.073** 
(0.035)     
0.081** 
(0.035)      
Business 
organisation 
High Winds  -0.254* 
(0.156)     
-0.378** 
(0.152)    
-0.323** 
(0.144)     
Contract 
security 
0.015**    




Missing markets  -0.070    
(0.045)    
  -0.076*    
(0.046)     
UIC -1.118***   
 (0.407)     
-0.815** 
(0.386)    
-0.739**  
 (0.368)     
Al Shabaab  0.356 




Food prices  -0.010    




0.808   
(0.515)    
0.591**  
(0.255)      
0.766*** 
(0.254)      
MPA 0.487 
(0.528) 
   Naval 
Intervention 
IRTC  0.086    
(0.486)      
  
  Constant  1.346***    




(0.171)     
 Pseudo  R2  0.358  0.329  0.288 
  Log likelihood  -108.67                  -113.30  -138.64                 
 Total 
observations 
108 108 127 
 Left-censored 
observations 
26 26 30 
 





  Acts of Piracy in the Gulf 
of Aden 
Acts of Piracy in the 
Somali Basin 
Attacks t-1 in region 0.173 
(0.142) 
  0.612***   
(0.168)     
0.607***   
(0.118)     
Successt-1 0.463   
(0.046)     
 -0.057   




 -.113**   
(0.045)     
-0.114**   
(0.044)    
Successt-3  -0.028   
(0.042)     
  -0.119**   
(0.051)     
-.115**    
(0.050)     
Successt-4 0.025 
(0.042) 
 -0.047   
(0.047)     
 
Successt-5 0.101***   
(0.041)      
0.076**   
0.037 
0.002   




High Winds  -0.073  
(0.165)     
  -0.493***   
(0.185)     
-0.517***   
(0.183)    
Contract security  -0.009  
(0.007)     
  0.029***   
0.009)      
0.028***   
(0.007)     
Missing markets  -0.155***  
(0.058)     
-0.127**  
.056808     
0.006   
(0.053)      
 
UIC  -0.627   
(0.465)     
-1.126***   
(0.444)     
-1.052**  
(0.464)     
-0.983**   
(0.444)     
Al Shabaab  -0.120  
(0.347)     
  0.150   




Food prices  0.001 
(0.008)      
  -0.019**   
(0.008)     
-0.018***   
(0.006)     
Governance Captured 
governance 
1.079**   
(0.537)      
1.255*** 
(0.222)      
0.707    
(0.584)      
1.033***   
(0.300)     
MPA  0.494   
(0.538)      
0.793**   
(0.358)     
0.654   
(0.613)      
  Naval 
Intervention 
IRTC -0.148   
(0.497)    
  0.657   
(0.566)    
 
  Constant  0.543   
(0.673)    
0.466***  
(0.122)     
1.318*   
(0.711)     
1.224**  
(0.581)     
  Pseudo  R2 0.341 0.272 0.338 0.325 
  Log likelihood  -101.80          -129.79          -98.36            -100.29         
 Total 
observations 
108 127 108 108 
 Left-censored 
observations 
39 39 45 45 
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Table 3 
 Obs  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
lnTotal 132  0  3.78  1.304  1.035 
lnAden 132  0  3.218  0.907  0.916 
lnSom 132  0  3.714  0.749  0.878 
Success 132  0  16  1.341  2.405 
Missing 
Markets 
132 0  10  1.197  1.749 
Contract 
Security 
108 7.692  86.538  53.971  27.518 
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1Operation Atalanta. 
2 Operation Allied Protector. 
3 Combined Task Force CTF-151. 
4 See Diagram 1. The figures include incidents carried out by Somali pirates in the Arabian Sea. 
5 Interview with Admiral Philip Jones and Captain Paul Chivers, London, 15 February 2010. 
6 See maps provided at the EDACS conflict data project website: http://www.sfb-
governance.de/teilprojekte/projekte_phase_1/projektbereich_c/c4/The_EDACS/index.html (Event Data Project 
on Conflict and Security).    
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7 In 2005 it was estimated that up to 700 foreign fishing trawlers operated illegally in Somali waters, often using 
destructive methods (Jasparro 2009) . While the argument that Somali fishermen were defending themselves 
against the predations of foreign fishing has been criticized as self-serving, it seems clear that piracy began this 
way and quite quickly evolved into an extortion business. 
8 Fish are attracted to the air-rich wake of large ships. 
9 For example, the Sirius Star hijacked in November 2008 contained oil worth US$100mn, while the ransom 
was 3mn. 
10 Personal communication with Bundespolizei, Luft- und Seesicherheit, Bundesministerium des Innern, 
Germany. 
11 This point will be addressed in further depth in a subsequent section in this paper. 
12 UN Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846 (2008). 
13 However, this seems to have been amended recently to “deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office 2010). 
14 If a pirate attack in the Gulf of Aden can be resisted by a ship for just twenty minutes, naval forces will 
generally be able to come to their assistance.  Interview with Captain Richard Farrington. 
15 The only exceptions occur where the entire crew retreats to a strongroom within the ship, so rescuers know 
that anyone visible on board is a pirate. 
16 Major General Howes, commander of the EU naval forces claimed that naval forces had repelled 100 attacks 
in the last 12 months (RUSI conference on Future Maritime Operations 2011). 
17 In the same period 190 attacks occurred in the Indian Ocean, 58 of these were successful.  
18 Of these ships, two missed convoys, so technically were not protected by the IRTC. Interview with Capt. 
Farrington. 
19 Interviews with Capt. Farrington, Capt. Chivers, and Adm. Jones. 
20 The British Foreign Office allegedly advised naval authorities that pirates seeking political asylum was a 
distinct possibility (Rivkin 2008). 
21 Arrangements were made to prosecute pirates in Kenya to make arrest less attractive (Gettleman 2009). 
22 Interview with Capt. Chivers. See also (EU force frees Somali 'pirates'  2010). 
23 The Combined Maritime Forces reported on 23 October 2009 that 611 pirates were encountered between 22 
August 2008 and 23 October 2009. Of these 358 were immediately released. 242 were turned over for 
prosecution. Out of 59 trials, 24 resulted in the release of the pirates. 
24 Interviews with Capt. Farrington, Capt. Chivers, and Adm. Jones. 
25 We use a dummy variable for monsoon months with average wind-speeds over 6 on the Beaufort scale to 
pinpoint the exact timing of the monsoon winds.  See also (Shortland and Vothknecht 2011; UNITAR 
Operational Satellite Applications Programme 2009). 
26 These variables are shown to be highly significant in explaining the development of prices and wages in the 
Somali economy (Shortland 2011). 
27 SWALIM gave up on re-establishing the old rainwater collection stations in June 2009 in favour of automated 
collection in a few locations. We therefore extrapolate the data from this point forwards: see 
http://www.faoswalim.org  (Somalia Water and Land Information Management). 
28 Further disaggregation of the IRTC dummy into its 2009 and 2010 components to reflect improved 
collaboration, a larger naval contingent and better co-operation by the private sector in 2010 was not statistically 
supported. 
29 In (anonymized) an earlier working paper version, we additionally employed Poisson and Negative Binomial 
specifications obtaining very similar results to the Tobit regressions. With an extra 18 months of data the 
variable distribution has become appropriate for Tobit analysis. 
30 The SWALIM contracting variable is only available from 2002 and is negatively correlated with the missing 
markets variable, so we report separate models for the two samples where appropriate. 
31 There is no equivalent effect for the Al-Shabaab dummy in Southern and Central Somaliain 2010, indicating 
that piracy is indeed mainly a Puntland phenomenon, rather than originating from the highly unstable Southern 
and Central Somalia. 
32 De Groot, Rablen and Shortland (2011) argue that the best case scenario for pirates would be a government 
that was highly effective but also corrupt: it would provide better infrastructure for pirates but allow them to 
work unimpeded. Hijack and ransom gives pirates approximately 2% of the value of their cargo while theft/sale 
gains 60-80% of the value – in other words enough governance to allow for a theft/sale model would be ideal. 
33 See maps provided at the EDACS conflict data project website: http://www.sfb-
governance.de/teilprojekte/projekte_phase_1/projektbereich_c/c4/The_EDACS/index.html. 
34 Classically the governmental function mafias provide is protection, in a situation where the state is unable or 
unwilling to provide it. In the case of Somalia, where the expectation of protection from the state is non-existent,    
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we argue that the main good provided is employment and suggest the subject of protection for other criminal 
business is a future avenue for research. 
35 Interviews with Capt. Farrington, Captain Chivers, and Admiral Jones. 
36 Interview with Captain Farrington, interview with Captain Chivers, interview with Admiral Jones. 
37 Interview with risk analyst and tanker captain /  Marine Superintendent. 
38 In August 2009, a gun battle between pirate gangs apparently killed 17; interestingly, the battle appears to 
have been fought “over land and a girl who was raped in the forest” rather than hostages. The pirates were 
concerned that the fight would damage their activities (Clashes rock Somali pirate port 2009). 
39 Interviews with Capt Farrington, Capt Chivers, Adm. Jones. 
40 A copy of such a manual was apparently found by French police on a released yacht (Hampton 2008). 
41 Customs receipts constitute 85% of total revenues (Puntland State of Somalia Ministry of Finance  2006-
2009) . 
42 It is not always significant in the full models due to its collinearity with the naval intervention dummies. 
43 Although Bossasso’s prison has a number of pirate inmates, these tend to be from non-local clans (Hansen 
2009). 
44 Interview with Canadian NATO naval contingent, 19 June 2009. Interviews with Capt. Farrington, Capt. 
Chivers, and Adm. Jones. 
45 Interview with Adm. Jones. 
46 Interview with Capt. Chivers. 
47 With the slowdown in world trade during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 the losses due to having a ship 
out of commission for a few months have also fallen. 
48 Interview with Capt. Chivers. 
49 Crews are aware that pirates reward compliant crews with better treatment. Interview with tanker captain. 
50 Interview with Captain Farrington. 
51 See for example the detailed analysis of costs in Van der Meijden (2008).   
52 See for example (Seeräuber in Hamburg vor Gericht 2010). 